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Apology and fforgfiveness evolve 
to resolve ffafilures fin cooperatfive 
agreements
Lufis A. Martfinez-Vaquero1,2, The Anh Han3, Luís Monfiz Perefira4 & Tom Lenaerts1,2
Makfing agreements on how to behave has been shown to be an evolutfionarfily vfiable strategy fin 
one-shot socfial dfilemmas. However, fin many sfituatfions agreements afim to establfish long-term 
mutualy beneficfial finteractfions. Our analytfical and numerfical results reveal ffor the first tfime under 
whfich condfitfions revenge, apology and fforgfiveness can evolve and deal wfith mfistakes wfithfin ongofing 
agreements fin the context off the Iterated Prfisoners Dfilemma. We show that, when the agreement 
ffafils, partficfipants preffer to take revenge by deffectfing fin the subsfistfing encounters. Incorporatfing 
costly apology and fforgfiveness reveals that, even when mfistakes are ffrequent, there exfists a sfincerfity 
threshold ffor whfich mfistakes wfil not lead to the destructfion off the agreement, finducfing even hfigher 
levels off cooperatfion. In short, even when to err fis human, revenge, apology and fforgfiveness are 
evolutfionarfily vfiable strategfies whfich play an fimportant role fin finducfing cooperatfion fin repeated 
dfilemmas.
Recently, our finnate capacfity to create, and commfit to, prfior agreements1–3 has been proposed as an 
evolutfionarfily vfiable strategy finducfing cooperatfive behavfior fin socfial dfilemmas. It provfides an alterna-
tfive to dfifferent fforms off punfishment off finapproprfiate behavfior, or off rewards to stfimulate the proper 
one4–8. Commfitments – deffned as prfior agreements wfith potentfialy posterfior compensatfions fin case 
the agreements ffafil – are wfide-spread fin human socfietfies at dfifferent scales, ffrom personal relatfionshfips 
such as marrfiage to finternatfional and organfisatfional ones such as alfiances among companfies and coun-
trfies1–3,9,10. Anthropologfical data reveals that commfitment strategfies, as ffor finstance demand-sharfing11, 
have played an essentfial role fin early hunter-gatherer socfietfies. A recent body off economfic experfiments 
show that arrangfing prfior commfitments promote cooperatfion fin dfiverse scenarfios ffrom one-shot to 
repeated games12–14. Analytfical and numerfical methods have shown that commfitments are evolutfionarfily 
vfiable when the cost off arrangfing them fis suffcfiently smal compared to the cost off cooperatfion both fin 
the one-shot pafirwfise prfisoners dfilemma15 and the one-shot publfic goods game16.
However, commfitment deals, lfike some examples mentfioned earlfier, are most offen establfished to 
ensure ffavourable finteractfions over longer tfime perfiods, fimplyfing repeated encounters between the 
actors that establfished the agreement, as wel as the appeal off repeated beneffts. Experfiments have shown 
that commfitment ffacfilfitates cooperatfion fin long-term finteractfions13,17, especfialy when fit fis voluntary. 
Moreover, long-term commfitments are most lfikely more cost-effcfient as the cost off setfing up the agree-
ment fis pafid only once ffor the entfire duratfion off the agreement. Interestfingly, commfitment may also 
finduce behavfioral dfifferences fin repeated games: As suggested fin2, the findfivfiduals’ prefferred behavfior fin 
repeated finteractfions may shfiff ffrom a condfitfional recfiprocal to an uncondfitfionaly cooperatfive behavfior, 
whfich wfil findeed be conffrmed analytficaly and numerficaly fin thfis manuscrfipt.
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Usfing methods ffrom Evolutfionary Game Teory18,19, we provfide ffor the ffrst tfime analytfical and 
numerfical finsfight finto the vfiabfilfity off commfitment strategfies fin repeated socfial finteractfions, whfich wfil 
be modeled through the Iterated Prfisoners Dfilemma (IPD)20. In order to study commfitment strategfies fin 
the IPD a number off behavfioral complexfitfies need to be addressed. Ffirst, agreements may end beffore the 
recurrfing finteractfions are ffnfished. As such, strategfies need to take finto account how to behave when the 
agreement fis present and when fit fis absent, on top off proposfing, acceptfing or rejectfing such agreements 
fin the ffrst place. Second, as fit was shown wfithfin the context off dfirect recfiprocfity21, findfivfiduals need to 
deal wfith mfistakes made by the opponent or by themselves, caused ffor finstance by “tremblfing hands” or 
“ffuzzy mfinds”19,22: A decfisfion needs to be made on whether to contfinue the agreement, or end fit colect-
fing the compensatfion resultfing ffrom the other’s deffectfion.
As errors mfight lead to mfisunderstandfings or even breakfing off commfitments, findfivfiduals may have 
acqufired sophfistficated strategfies to ensure that mfistakes are not repeated or that profftable relatfionshfips 
may contfinue. Revenge and fforgfiveness may have evolved exactly to cope wfith those sfituatfions23,24: Te 
threat off revenge, through some punfishment off wfithholdfing off a benefft, may dfiscourage finterpersonal 
harm. Yet offen one cannot dfistfingufish wfith enough certafinty fiff the other’s behavfior fis fintentfional or just 
accfidental25,26. In the later case, fforgfiveness provfides a restoratfive mechanfism that ensures that beneffcfial 
relatfionshfips can stfil contfinue, notwfithstandfing the finfitfial harm. An essentfial fingredfient ffor fforgfiveness, 
analysed fin thfis work, seems to be (costly) apology23, a pofint emphasfised fin27.
Te fimportance off apology and fforgfiveness ffor sustafinfing long term relatfionshfips has been shown 
fin dfifferent experfiments28–31. Apology and fforgfiveness are off finterest as they remove the finterfference off 
external finstfitutfions, whfich can be qufite costly to al partfies finvolved, fin order to ensure cooperatfion. 
Evfidence shows that there fis a much hfigher chance that customers stay wfith a company (they hence 
fforgfive) that apologfises ffor mfistakes28. Apology leads to ffewer lawsufits wfith lower setlements fin med-
fical error sfituatfions32. Apology even enters the law as an effectfive mechanfism off resolvfing conffficts33,34. 
Hence, fit fis fimportant to know how apology and fforgfiveness can help copfing wfith mfisunderstandfing, 
on efither sfide, fin an finternal way, wfithout jeopardfisfing the ongofing commfitment. Even wfithout explficfit 
apology, the partficfipants fin an IPD seem to use a fform off fimplficfit apology, by cooperatfing fin several sub-
sequent rounds affer makfing a mfistake35–37. Yet, such an unclear apology mfight not thoroughly resolve 
the mfisunderstandfing, as fis the case ffor TFT-lfike strategfies35,36,38,39].
In thfis work, once the vfiabfilfity off the commfitment strategy wfithfin the context off the IPD fis analysed, 
we analytficaly and numerficaly determfine when explficfit apology and fforgfiveness are evolutfionarfily vfia-
ble, and how sfincere apology needs to be ffor fforgfiveness, thus sustafinfing the mutualy beneffcfial rela-
tfionshfip, whfich so ffar we are aware have never been provfided.
Results
Definfing al strategfies. We consfider a ffnfite populatfion off N findfivfiduals, wfith N = 100 fin our analy-
sfis. At the begfinnfing off each generatfion, findfivfiduals are randomly matched to play an IPD game. In each 
round off thfis game they can efither cooperate (C) or deffect (D), acqufirfing a payoff gfiven by the Donatfion 
game19 — an finstance off the PD – as represented by the ffolowfing parametrfised payoff matrfix wfith b > c:

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Wfith a probabfilfity ω the encounter between two findfivfiduals fis repeated ffor another round, leadfing to 
an average number off rounds per IPD finteractfion RT = (1–ω)−1. Indfivfiduals may make fimplementatfion mfistakes, fi.e. playfing D when they fintend to play C and vfice versa, wfith a probabfilfity α. At the end off a 
generatfion, more successfful findfivfiduals – those that accumulated hfigher total payoffs – are more lfikely 
to be fimfitated by less successfful findfivfiduals (see Methods ffor more detafils).
At the ffrst encounter beffore playfing the IPD, findfivfiduals can agree to play C fin every round off the 
game. To set up a commfitment one off the players has to propose fit, at a cost ε (players share that cost 
fiff both are proposers), whfile the co-player needs to decfide whether to accept fit. Te commfitment lasts 
as long as both players ffulffl thefir commfitment, fi.e. they play C. Iff one deffects then she has to pay a 
compensatfion δ to the other player and the commfitment fis broken.
When nefither player proposes a commfitment or the commfitment ends, both findfivfiduals play a reac-
tfive strategy35, whfich fis modeled by a trfiplet (p0,pC,pD): p0 represents the probabfilfity off cooperatfing fin the ffrst round, pC the probabfilfity off cooperatfing fin the current round fiff fin the prevfious round the co-player cooperated and sfimfilarly ffor pD, whfich fis the probabfilfity off cooperatfing fin the current round fiff the co-player deffected fin the prevfious round. In thfis work, we wfil only consfider pure reactfive strategfies fin 
the presence off nofise (α): always cooperatfing AlC, (1 – α,1 – α,1 – α), always deffectfing AlD (α,α,α), 
TFT (1 – α,1 – α,α) and antfi-TFT (ATFT) (1 – α,α,1 – α). Al these strategfies, except AlD, play C fin 
the ffrst round.
Tus, the fful strategy Sfi off any findfivfidual fin our model fis deffned by three parameters Sfi = (Sc,Sfin,Sout)fi, where
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•	Sc ∈ {P,A,NC} represents whether the strategy fis a proposfing player who proposes and accepts com-mfitments (P), an acceptfing player who does not propose a commfitment but accepts those that are 
proposed (A), or a non-commfitfing player that never accepts a commfitment proposal strategy (NC). 
We consfider at thfis pofint only sfimultaneous finteractfions, meanfing that when both players propose 
to commfit they do thfis at the same tfime, hence sharfing the commfitment cost.
•	Sfin ∈ {C,D} findficates the behavfior the player chooses when she fis fin a commfitment: cooperatfing wfith a probabfilfity 1–α (C) or α (D). Non-commfiters do not have any Sfin strategy sfince they never partficfipate fin commfitments, whfich wfil be represented by Sfin = “–’’ fin the strategy Sfi.•	Sout ∈ {AlC,AlD,TFT,ATFT} represents the reactfive strategy chosen by the player when not fin a commfitment.
Hence the strategy off a deffector or a cooperator fis represented here by, respectfively, (NC,–,AlD) and 
(A,C,AlC). A strategy that proposes a commfitment, and honours the agreement, whfile deffectfing when 
the agreement fis broken fis represented by (P,C,AlD). Te strategfies FAKE and FREE, dfiscussed fin15, 
could be represented by (A,D,*), wfith “*’ representfing any off the Sout optfions, and (A,C,*) respectfively.Ffinaly, we need to consfider that when the commfitment fis broken, or when the agreement fis not 
created, findfivfiduals can decfide to sfimply stop the game, whfich results fin a zero payoff ffor al ffolowfing 
rounds. Proposers that do not play when the commfitment fis broken wfil not have an Sout strategy. Tese two possfibfilfitfies lead to ffour dfifferent scenarfios:
•	PP: findfivfiduals contfinue to play thefir reactfive strategfies both when the commfitment fis not set up 
and affer an establfished commfitment fis broken,
•	NP: they play thefir reactfive strategfies once a commfitment ends, but stop finteractfing fiff a commfitment 
fis rejected (even fiff addfitfional rounds could be played),
•	PN: findfivfiduals play thefir reactfive strategy fiff a proposed commfitment fis not accepted, but stop finter-
actfing fiff a commfitment fis broken,
•	NN: findfivfiduals reffuse to play fin any off these sfituatfions.
Gfiven these ffour scenarfios, one can fidentfiffy 20 strategfies ffor PP, NP and PN scenarfios, and 14 strate-
gfies ffor the NN scenarfio. Te number off strategfies wfil fincrease when an apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism 
fis fintroduced, as fis shown later. It fis not clear whfich off these scenarfios leads to the most cooperatfive out-
come. Our results, as dfiscussed below, afim to reveal, when findfivfiduals can choose by themselves whfich 
scenarfio to use, whfich off the ffour scenarfios fis evolutfionary more vfiable than the other. In other words, 
fis fit best to always play the game, usfing thefir Sfi strategfies or should one reffuse the finteractfion when the agreement cannot be establfished or when fit fis broken (or both)? Te detafils on how the payoffs ffor each 
strategy are calculated are provfided fin Methods.
The emergence off revenge affter the commfitment fis broken. We ffrst study commfitments fin the 
absence off an apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism. In thfis sfituatfion, there are two mafin dfifferences wfith the 
model fin15 next to the fiterated nature off the game: the finclusfion off nofisy C and D actfions and how players 
react when commfitments ffafil or cannot be establfished (prevfiously caled scenarfios PP, PN, NP and NN).
In Ffig.  1a, where the ffour scenarfios are analysed separately, we plot ffor each scenarfio the ffrequen-
cfies off the most domfinant strategfies relatfive to the ffrequency off deffectors (fi.e. (NC,–,AlD) whfich do 
not commfit when requested, hence have no Sfin, and always deffect when no agreement fis establfished or an establfished one fis broken) as a ffunctfion off the errors (α) that findfivfiduals can make whfile playfing. 
Tese relatfive ffrequencfies reveal ffor whfich nofise levels the later can suppress the deffectfion strategy 
(see Supplementary Table 1 ffor the outcome ffor al strategfies). In al ffour scenarfios the domfinatfing 
strategfies are, ffor most nofise levels, off the type (P,C,*), whfich correspond to proposers that cooper-
ate as long as the commfitment lasts and then behave reactfively when the commfitment fis broken (see 
Supplementary Infformatfion ffor addfitfional data on the results obtafined ffor dfifferent condfitfions, fincludfing 
the benefft-to-cost ratfio, the cost off establfishfing a commfitment, and the penalty ffor breakfing the commfit-
ment). One can see that fin general the relatfive ffrequency off these proposers decreases as the nofise level 
fincreases: Te hfigher the nofise the more lfikely a commfitment fis broken unfintentfionaly. Te scenarfios 
PP and NP dfiffer ffrom the other two finasmuch as proposers can only sustafin themselves fin the later ffor 
lower nofise levels (α < 10−1). Te (P,C,AlD) strategfies are beter off fin al ffour scenarfios, domfinatfing fin 
the PP and NP scenarfios even ffor hfigh nofise levels and low benefft-to-cost ratfios, whfich correspond to 
more severe socfial dfilemmas. As fin the PN and NN scenarfios proposers can only sustafin themselves ffor 
lower nofise levels, commfitment proposfing strategfies fin IPD seem to be more successfful fiff they are capa-
ble to actfively take revenge by wfithholdfing the benefft (through deffectfion) agafinst findfivfiduals breakfing 
commfitments beffore the end off the game.
Commfitment proposfing strategfies survfive fin combfinatfion wfith dfifferent types off acceptfing strate-
gfies (Supplementary Table 1). Tese acceptfing strategfies are remfinfiscent off the FREE, fi.e. the acceptfing 
strategfies that cooperate when an agreement fis establfished, and FAKE, fi.e. the acceptfing strategfies that 
deffect fin the commfitment, types analysed beffore fin the context off the one-shot PD and publfic goods 
games15,16. Interestfingly, revenge also plays an fimportant role here as, under hfighly erroneous condfitfions, 
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these acceptfing strategfies wfil also preffer to wfithhold the beneffts ffrom the proposer when the agreement 
ends. Note that the same transfitfion ffrom TFT to AlD, ffor hfigher nofise levels, can be observed when no 
commfitments are possfible fin the IPD (see Supplementary Ffigure 2).
Ffigure  1b conffrms the earlfier observatfion that proposfing strategfies are more successfful when they 
can actfively take revenge: fiff players can choose how to act outsfide off the commfitment finstead off havfing 
fit fimposed externaly (fin other words, each findfivfidual decfides whfich one off the ffour scenarfios to use fin 
fits strategy), the best strategfies are those that deffect (or play TFT fin a ffew cases) affer the commfitment 
fis broken. Hence, not playfing when there fis no agreement or when fit fis broken (NN) or only when the 
agreement fis broken (PN) fis less vfiable as a strategy than contfinufing to play fin al sfituatfions (PP) or only 
reffusfing to play when no agreement can be establfished (NP). Interestfingly, the possfibfilfity off proposfing 
prfior commfitments changes the nature off the repeated game as fit finduces the emergence off revenge or 
retalfiatfion rather than recfiprocfity or avofidfing to finteract (correspondfing to the PN and NN scenarfios) 
once commfitment fis broken2,14. Tfis result fis fin contradfictfion to what happens when one does not have 
the optfion off proposfing commfitments fin the IPD, where TFT fis the most fimportant strategy ffor low levels 
off nofise (Supplementary Ffigure 2). As such, commfitments reduce the advantage off TFT fin comparfison 
to AlD, alterfing the game and resultfing fin the sfituatfion where AlD becomes more vfiable than TFT.
One could hypothesfise that revenge may lead to a lower level off cooperatfion sfince proposers end up 
deffectfing when they are not fin a commfitment. Nevertheless, Ffig.  2 reveals that the presence off these 
retalfiatfing commfitment proposfing strategfies (fin each off the ffour scenarfios) fincreases the level off cooper-
atfion: When comparfing the black lfine to the coloured lfines fin that ffgure, cooperatfion fincreases (Ffig. 2a) 
and deffectfion decreases (Ffig. 2b), yet thfis decrease hfides that certafin scenarfios suffer ffrom an fincrease fin 
games not befing played (Ffig. 2c). For finstance, although the level off deffectfion fin NN seems lower than fin 
PP, one needs to take finto account that not playfing could be consfidered an alternatfive fform off deffectfion. 
Hence, when combfinfing deffectfion and not playfing, the PP scenarfio has the hfighest level off cooperatfion 
(≈ 0.6) and the lowest level off deffectfion (≈ 0.4), makfing fit the best approach to finduce cooperatfion fin a 
populatfion (see also Ffig. 1b).
Forgfiveness requfires a sfincere apology to ensure cooperatfion. Introducfing apology and ffor-
gfiveness requfires us to extend the strategy Sfi wfith at least one addfitfional parameter representfing apol-ogy and fforgfiveness (ffor a more elaborate model descrfiptfion see Methods). Under the assumptfion that 
fforgfiveness occurs fiff and only fiff an apology took place, the apology parameter qapo determfines whether a player apologfises affer deffectfing, payfing a compensatfion amount γ to the other player. Wfith thfis deff-
nfitfion, the strategy off a player fi fis now extended to Sfi = (Sc,Sfin,Sout,qapo)fi. We assume a strategy apologfises when qapo = 1 and does not when qapo = 0.We ffocus here on costly apology (γ > 0) and how fit finduces fforgfiveness as costless apology (γ = 0), 
befing equfivalent to fforgfiveness wfithout apology, does not substantfialy change the condfitfions under 
whfich proposers are beter than pure deffectors: Forgfivers only do beter when the benefft-to-cost ratfio 
fis hfigh enough (see Supplementary Ffigures 6 and 7).
Ffigure 1. Success off commfitments and revenge affer commfitments break. Statfionary dfistrfibutfion off the 
most domfinant strategfies (proposers that cooperate wfithfin the commfitment) relatfive to the statfionary 
dfistrfibutfion off the pure deffectors as a ffunctfion off nofise ffor PP, NP, PN and NN scenarfios separately (a) and 
together (b). Dfifferent lfines correspond to dfifferent Sout. We assumed ω = 0.9, b/c = 2, ε = 0.25, and δ = 4.
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Ffigure  3 shows that when the compensatfion (γ ) gfiven upon apology fis bfigger than or equal to the 
cost off cooperatfing (γ>c), proposers that cooperate durfing commfitments, apologfise when they deffect by mfistake and fforgfive when recefivfing an equfivalent apology become the best strategfists fin the IPD, fin 
al scenarfios (see also Supplementary Infformatfion). Tey reach a maxfimum when c < γ < δ and con-
tfinue domfinatfing the populatfion untfil γ becomes too hfigh (γ ≈ 7 ffor the PP scenarfio and 0.1 nofise, and 
even hfigher ffor other scenarfios, but wfith sfimfilar paterns; see Supplementary Infformatfion), leadfing to 
the sfituatfion where revenge, fi.e. (P,C,AlD,qapo = 0), becomes once agafin the beter chofice. However, when the cost off apology fis not hfigh enough (lower than c), ffake proposers and acceptors, fi.e. 
(P,D,AlD,qapo = 1) and (A,D,AlD,qapo = 1), take over. Tese ffake proposers and acceptors systematficaly explofit the apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism, leadfing to the decrease off cooperatfion. Hence our results 
show that apology needs to be suffcfiently sfincere, meanfing not too low, not too hfigh (δ > γ > c), fin 
order ffor fforgfiveness to ffunctfion properly, whfich fintufitfively makes a lot off sense. Actualy, one can show 
that the cooperatfive proposer fis a domfinant strategy agafinst the deffectfing proposer when γ > c and 
agafinst the deffectfing acceptor when γ > c + 3ε/4 fin the absence off nofise and fiff al off them apologfise (see 
Methods). Accordfing to Ffig.  3, reducfing the nofise affects the fimportance off the apologfisfing strategy 
(P,C,AlD,qapo = 1) relatfive to the deffectfing and non-apologfisfing strategy (P,C,AlD,qapo = 0), yet the pat-terns descrfibed above remafin valfid.
Under the assumptfion off hfigh nofise levels (α ≈ 0.1), whfich reduces the level off cooperatfion (see 
Ffig.  2), we can now see fin Ffig.  4 that apology plus fforgfiveness serfiously boost the level off cooperatfion 
and reduce deffectfion when γ > c. Yet fiff the apology fis not sfincere enough (γ < c) one can observe the 
Ffigure 2. Commfitments fincrease the level off cooperatfion. Levels off cooperatfion (a), deffectfion (b) and non-
playfing (c) ffor the domfinant strategfies (proposers that cooperate wfithfin the commfitment), as a ffunctfion off 
the nofise ffor the dfifferent scenarfios. Te black lfines correspond to the sfituatfion where commfitments cannot 
be made, servfing as a baselfine ffor the other approaches. We assumed ω = 0.9, b/c = 2, ε = 0.25, and δ = 4.
Ffigure 3. Forgfiveness fis evolutfionary vfiable fiff apology fis sfincere. Statfionary dfistrfibutfion off the mafin 
strategfies wfith respect to the statfionary dfistrfibutfion off the pure deffectors as a ffunctfion off the apology cost 
ffor the PP scenarfio and α = 0.01 (leff) and α = 0.1 (rfight). Vertfical dashed lfines mark the values off c and δ. 
We assumed ω = 0.9, b/c = 2(wfith c = 1), ε = 0.25, and δ = 4.
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opposfite behavfior, even fin the PP scenarfio case. Introducfing nofise fin the apology and fforgfiveness decfi-
sfions does not generate qualfitatfive dfifferences fin these conclusfions. In Supplementary Infformatfion we 
analyse the finffuence off the average number or rounds (see Supplementary Ffigures 9-11), showfing that 
fin repeated finteractfions commfitments become fincreasfingly beneffcfial especfialy when affer commfitment 
fis broken one takes apology and revenge finto account.
Evolutfion selects sfincerfity fin apology and fforgfiveness. Clearly, the decfisfion off how strongly to 
apologfise or when to accept an apology are personal chofices. As such, findfivfiduals can apologfise at dfiff-
fferent costs γ and can fforgfive deffectfion condfitfional on a personal threshold τγ. Tereffore, fiff the strategy fis fforgfivfing, the parameter τγ fis used to decfide whether the player wfil fforgfive the opponent or not.Lfimfitfing here the analysfis only to strategfies that deffect when they are not commfitfing we determfine 
whfich threshold and apology values evolve under natural selectfion. Reducfing the number off strategfies 
to these ones does not reduce the generalfity off the results, sfince they are the domfinant ones (that always 
accumulate fin almost 100% ffractfion off the populatfion) as we have shown beffore.
Ffigure 5 reveals whfich thresholds (τγ) are prefferred and whfich apologfies (γ ) are requfired ffor the PP scenarfio (addfitfional results show almost the same results are obtafined ffor the other scenarfios). Ffirst one 
can observe that expectfing a hfigher apology than one actualy offered (τγ > γ )fis always a bad strategy: fin al the sfituatfions vfisualfised fin the ffgure, thfis sfituatfion leads to loss off cooperatfive commfitment pro-
posers, and hence cooperatfion fin general. As was learned too ffrom the results fin Ffig. 3 and Ffig. 4, fit fis 
stfil not a good strategy to pay too hfigh cost to apologfise, as thfis behavfior tends to dfisappear ffrom the 
populatfion. We see that the domfinatfing strategfies have apology values (γ )fin the same regfion as the ones 
shown fin Ffig. 3. In Ffig. 5 one can also observe that the hfigher the nofise the more strategfies converge to 
concrete values off γ  and τγ, fin other words, the more fimportant fis the apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism due to a hfigher number off mfistakes, as also shown fin Ffig.  3. Yet, one can also observe fin Ffig.  5 that 
apology and fforgfiveness are less fimportant fin more severe games (fi.e. very low benefft-to-cost ratfios).
Nevertheless, results show that even fin the case off findfivfidual chofices, apology and fforgfiveness provfide 
an fimportant mechanfism ensurfing that commfitments can remafin stable and both partfies can contfinue 
to profft ffrom thefir orfigfinal agreement.
Dfiscussfion
Creatfing agreements and askfing others to commfit to such agreements provfides a basfic behavfioral mech-
anfism that fis present at al the levels off socfiety, playfing a key role fin socfial finteractfions2,10,14. Although 
fit was shown that thfis behavfior fis evolutfionary vfiable, lfitle analytfical and numerfical finsfight fis avafilable 
on how to handle agreements and commfitments fin repeated finteractfions. Te results dfiscussed fin thfis 
work ffl thfis gap by clarfiffyfing and extendfing the observatfions made fin experfiments lfike12,13, whfile also 
showfing that, sfimfilar to the one-shot finteractfion scenarfio, the fintroductfion off ongofing subsfistfing com-
mfitments leads to hfigher levels off cooperatfion whenever the cost fis suffcfiently smal and the compen-
satfion fis hfigh enough. Our work reveals how, when movfing to repeated games, the detrfimental effect off 
havfing a large arrangement cost fis moderated as a subsfistfing commfitment can play fits role ffor several 
finteractfions. In these scenarfios, the most successfful findfivfiduals are those that propose commfitments 
(and are wfilfing to pay thefir cost) and, ffolowfing the agreement, cooperate unless a mfistake occurs. But fiff 
the commfitment fis broken then these findfivfiduals take revenge and deffect fin the remafinfing finteractfions, 
Ffigure 4. Sfincere apology fincreases the level off cooperatfion. Levels off cooperatfion (a), deffectfion (b) and 
non-playfing (c) ffor the mafin strategfies (proposers that cooperate wfithfin the commfitment) as a ffunctfion off 
the apology cost ffor the dfifferent scenarfios. Vertfical dashed lfines mark the values off c and δ. We assumed 
ω = 0.9, b/c = 2, α = 0.1, ε = 0.25, and δ = 4.
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conffrmfing analytficaly what has been argued fin23,24. Tfis result fis fintrfigufing as revenge by wfith holdfing 
the benefft ffrom the transgressor may lead to a more ffavorable outcome ffor cooperatfive behavfior fin the 
IPD as opposed to the wel-known recfiprocal behavfior such as TFT-lfike strategfies.
Yet, as mfistakes durfing any (long-term) relatfionshfip are practficaly finevfitable, findfivfiduals need to 
decfide whether fit fis worthwhfile to end the agreement and colect the compensatfion when a mfistake fis 
made or whether fit fis beter to fforgfive the co-player and contfinue the mutualy beneffcfial agreement. 
To study thfis questfion the commfitment model was extended wfith an apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism, 
where apology was deffned efither as an external or findfivfidual parameter fin the model. In both cases, we 
have shown that fforgfiveness fis effectfive fiff fit takes place affer recefivfing an apology ffrom the co-players. 
However, to play a promotfing role ffor cooperatfion, apology needs to be sfincere, fin other words, the 
amount offered fin the apology has to be hfigh enough (yet not too hfigh), whfich fis also corroborated by a 
recent experfimental psychology paper40. Tfis extensfion to the commfitment model produces even hfigher 
cooperatfion levels than fin the revenge-based outcome. In the opposfite case, ffake commfiters that pro-
pose or accept to commfit wfith the fintentfion to take advantage off the system (deffectfing and apologfisfing 
contfinuously) wfil domfinate the populatfion. In thfis sfituatfion, the fintroductfion off the apology-fforgfiveness 
mechanfism destroys the fincrease off the cooperatfion level that commfitments by themselves produce. 
Hence there fis a lower-lfimfit on how sfincere apology needs be as below thfis lfimfit apology and fforgfiveness 
even reduce the level off cooperatfion one could expect ffrom sfimply takfing revenge. It has been shown fin 
prevfious works that mfistakes can even finduce the outbreak off cheatfing or fintolerant behavfior fin socfi-
ety41,42, and only a strfict ethfics can prevent them42, whfich fin our case would be understood as fforgfivfing 
just when apology fis sfincere.
Commfitments fin repeated finteractfion setfings may take the fform off loyalty17,43, whfich fis dfifferent 
ffrom our commfitments regardfing posterfior compensatfions, whfich do not assume a partner chofice mech-
anfism. Loyalty commfitment fis based on the fidea that findfivfiduals tend to stay wfith or select partners 
based on the length off thefir prfior finteractfions. We go beyond these works by showfing that, even wfithout 
partner chofice, commfitment can ffoster cooperatfion and long-term relatfionshfips especfialy when accom-
panfied wfith a sfincere apology and fforgfiveness whenever mfistakes are made.
Ffigure 5. Tresholds ffor condfitfional fforgfiveness. Statfionary dfistrfibutfion off cooperatfive proposers as a 
ffunctfion off the cost off thefir apologfies γ and the threshold τγ they requfire to fforgfive a co-player ffor the PP 
scenarfio. We assumed ω = 0.9, ε = 0.25 and δ = 4.
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A substantfial body off economfic experfiments on commfitments, apology and fforgfiveness, have been 
carrfied out, and the results ffrom thfis work are fin close accordance wfith the outcomes off those exper-
fiments14,26,29,31. In14, a PGG experfiment shows that when commfitment fis arranged fin advance, and set 
up afferwards, hfigh levels off cooperatfion are observed. But fiff the commfitment ffafils to fform (fi.e. some 
partficfipants do not agree to commfit), the players act sfignfiffcantly less cooperatfive than when they had no 
opportunfity to jofin a commfitment. Tfis outcome fis sfimfilar to the emergence off AlD strategy whenever 
commfitment fis not fformed or when fit fis fformed but then broken fin our system. Next, several economfic 
experfiments show that apology only promotes cooperatfion when fit fis sfincere, fi.e. costly enough26,29,31. 
Ohtsubo’s experfiment31 shows that a costlfier apology fis beter at communficatfing sfincerfity, and as a con-
sequence wfil be more offen fforgfiven. Tfis observatfion fis shown to be valfid across cultures29. In another 
laboratory experfiment26, the authors showed apologfies work because they can help reveal the fintentfion 
behfind the wrongdoers precedfing offence. In complfiance wfith thfis observatfion, fin our model, an apology 
fis mostly made by those who fintended to cooperate but deffect by mfistake.
In conclusfion, our results demonstrate that even when “to err fis human”44, behavfiors lfike revenge and 
fforgfiveness can evolve to cope wfith mfistakes, even when they occur at hfigh rates. On the other hand, 
mfistakes are not necessarfily fintentfional and even when they are fit mfight stfil be worthwhfile to contfinue 
a mutualy beneffcfial agreement. Yet, as shown fin thfis work, a sfincerfity threshold exfists where the cost 
off apologfisfing should exceed that off cooperatfion to finduce the later.
Methods
Payoffs under commfitments. Payoffs fintroduced fin the manuscrfipt depend on the concrete strate-
gfies that players fi and j decfide to choose. A commfitment fis set up only fiff both players are proposers and 
as such, both share the cost off establfishfing fit ( ε= =− /ε εw w 2fij jfi ), or only one off the players (fi) fis a proposer and the other fis an acceptor (j) and then only the ffrst one has to pay that cost ( ε=−εwfij  and =εw 0jfi ). Denote RCfij the number off rounds the players are, on average, fin the commfitment. Hence, RCfij fis a ffunctfion off the probabfilfity that the commfitment fis not broken fin the next round, denoted by Ω fij, and the probabfilfity that the IPD game contfinues ffor another round ω, whfich can be wrfiten as ffolows:
ω= −Ω . ()R
1
1 2C
fij
fij
We denote by pα,fij the vector that represents the probabfilfity that players fi and j actualy play CC, CD, DC, and DD, respectfively, fin a round. Te probabfilfity that the commfitment contfinues once both players 
choose thefir actfions depends on the apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism and fis represented by the vector 
qc,fij = (1,qfij,qjfi,qfijqjfi). Ten
Ω = ⋅ . ()α, ,p q 3fij fij cfij
Durfing the commfitment, the fi-player obtafins a payoff per round.
=Ω , ()w
h
4C
fij fij
fij
( )∑= + ⋅ ()α γ, ,h p q g g 5fij k fijk cfijk k k
except fin the last round, where she recefives wlastfij. We have represented g = (b − c, − c, b, 0) as the vector that contafins the payoffs comfing dfirectly ffrom the IPD payoff matrfix that the ffrst player obtafin fin states 
(CC, CD, DC, DD). Te vector gγ = (0, γ ,− γ , 0) stands ffor the payoffs lfinked to the apologfies needed to mafintafin the commfitment when any player deffects. Te payoff recefived fin the last round can be com-
puted as
ω= −Ω , ()w
h
1 6last
fij fij
last
fij
ω= ( − )+ , ()h h h1 7fijlast fij fij
where hfij denotes the payoff that the fi-strategfist obtafins fiff the commfitment fis broken:
( )∑= ′ + , ()α δ, ,h p q g g 8fij k fijk cfijk k k
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( )′ = , − , − , − , (), q q q qq 01 1 9cfij fij jfi jfi fij
δ δδ γ=(,,−, − ). ( )δg 0 10
Note that the last element off q'c,fij and gδ vectors takes finto account whether one or only one off the players fforgfives a mutual deffectfive behavfiour fin the commfitment.
Ve c tor pα,fij depends on the strategfies Sfinfi and Sfinj, as wel as on the nofise, so that ffunctfions Ω fij and hfij, and payoff wlastfij depend on them as wel. Four dfifferent scenarfios can be descrfibed as a ffunctfion off these strategfies:
•	Both players fintend to cooperate when they commfit = =S S Cfinfi finj :
α α α α α α=(( − ), ( − ), ( − ), ), ( )α,p 1 1 1 11fij 2 2
α α α αΩ =( − ) + ( − )( + )+ , ( )q q qq1 1 12fij fij jfi fij jfi2 2
α γ γ α α=( −)( − ) +( − ) +( −)

 ( − ), ( )h b c b q cq1 1 13fij jfi fij
2
α γ γ α α=( −)( − ) +( −) +( − )

 ( − ), ( )h b c cq b q1 1 14jfi jfi fij
2
α δ γ α ω=( −)( − )−( − ) ( − )− , ( )h b c q q h1 15fijlast fij jfi fij
α δ γ α ω=( −)( − )+( − ) ( − )− . ( )h b c q q h1 16jfilast fij jfi jfi
•	Both players fintend to deffect fin a commfitment = =S S Dfinfi finj :
α α α α α α=( , (− ), (− ),(− )), ( )α,p 1 1 1 17fij 2 2
( )α α αΩ =( − ) + + + , ( )qq q q1 18fij fij jfi fij jfi2 2
α γ γ α α=( −) +( − ) +( −)

 ( − ), ( )h b c b q cq 1 19fij jfi fij
2
α γ γ α α=( −) +( −) +( − )

 ( − ), ( )h b c cq b q 1 20jfi jfi fij
2
α δ γ α ω=( −) −( − )( − )( − )− , ( )h b c q q h1 21fijlast fij jfi fij
α δ γ α ω=( −) +( − )( − )( − )− . ( )h b c q q h1 22jfilast fij jfi jfi
•	Player fi fintends to cooperate and her co-player j fintends to deffect =S Cfinfi  and =S Dfinj :
α α α α α α=(( − ),( − ), , (− )), ( )α,p 1 1 1 23fij 2 2
α α α αΩ =( − ) + ( − )(+ )+ , ( )q qq q1 1 1 24fij fij fijjfi jfi2 2
α α γ α γ α=( −) ( − )+( − ) +( −)(− ) , ( )h b c b q c q1 1 25fij jfi fij2 2
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α α γ α γ α=( −) ( − )+( −) +( − )(− ) , ( )h b c c q b q1 1 26jfi jfi fij2 2
α α αδ α α δ γ ω= − ( − )+( − ) −( − ) −

( − )− , ( )h b c q q h1 1 2 1 27fij
last
fij jfi fij
α α αδ α α δ γ ω=− + ( − )−( − ) +( − ) −

( − )− . ( )h c b q q h1 1 2 1 28jfi
last
fij jfi jfi
•	Player fi fintends to deffect and player j fintends to cooperate =S Dfinfi  and =S Cfinj . Tfis case fis equfiva-lent to swfitch fi and j findfices fin the prevfious case.
Sfince commfitments last as ffar as nobody deffects, = −w b cCfij  fin the absence off any apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism.
Payoffs wfithout commfitments. When findfivfiduals play thefir reactfive strategfies Sout, payoffs can be computed usfing the method descrfibed by19. In each round off thfis game there are ffour possfible states 
(CC, CD, DC, DD) dependfing on the actfions off player fi and j. Takfing finto account that the actfion off a 
player fin the current round fis gfiven by the actfion off the co-player fin the prevfious one, the process can 
be descrfibed as a Markov chafin fin the state space. Te stochastfic matrfix Q that represents the transfitfion 
probabfilfitfies fis gfiven by
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
=



( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )



⋅
( )
Q
pp p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
pp p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 29
Cfi Cj Cfi Cj Cfi Cj Cfi Cj
Dfi Cj Dfi Cj Dfi Cj Dfi Cj
Cfi Dj Dfi Dj Dfi Dj Cfi Dj
Dfi Dj Dfi Dj Dfi Dj Dfi Dj
Te finfitfial probabfilfitfies ffor the ffour states are gfiven by the vector
( )( ) ( )= , − , ( − ) ,( − ) − . ( )p p p p p p p pP 1 1 1 1 30fi j fi j fi j fi j0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ten the total payoff that a fi-strategfist obtafins playfing wfith a j-strategfist fin the lack off commfitments fis
ω= ⋅ ( − ) ( )−W g P I Q 31outfij 0 1
where I fis the fidentfity matrfix off sfize 4.
Evolutfionary dynamfics. We have chosen a dfiscrete fimfitatfion dynamfic fin a populatfion off N findfivfid-
uals45, 46. Accordfing to thfis dynamfics, two findfivfiduals are selected at random ffrom the populatfion. Te 
probabfilfity that the ffrst findfivfidual adopts the strategy off the second one fis gfiven by a Fermfi fimfitatfion 
probabfilfity ffunctfion ( + )β∆− ∏−e1 147,48. Te parameter β represents the fintensfity off selectfion, fi.e. the 
strength findfivfiduals base thefir decfisfion to fimfitate the others, and Δ Π fis the dfifference off payoffs between 
both findfivfiduals. We have chosen β = 0.1 ffor al the calculatfions showed here. Note that the payoff fis a 
measure off the success off findfivfiduals and thereffore the hfigher the payoff the hfigher the probabfilfity off 
befing fimfitated by others18,19.
A dfiscrete dynamfics lfike the one we are consfiderfing here always leads to an asymptotficaly homoge-
neous populatfion. Sfince only mutatfions (finvasfions) can fintroduce new strategfies, a homogeneous pop-
ulatfion fis always an absorbfing state. We calculate the probabfilfitfies off the dfifferent finvasfions as ffxatfion 
probabfilfitfies, fi.e. the probabfilfity that a sfingle finvader wfil eventualy be fimfitated by al the rest off findfi-
vfiduals, who play the resfident strategy, and thfis under the assumptfion off the smal mutatfion lfimfit49. Note 
that due to fits complexfity we do not consfider the possfibfilfity off mfixed equfilfibrfia, lfike fin other prevfious 
works50. Tfis ffxatfion probabfilfity fis gfiven by19,51
∑∏ρ =+
()
()


, ( )=
−
=
−
+
−T k
T k1 32jfi m
N
k
m
1
1
1
1
where T+(k) fis the probabfilfity that an findfivfidual off the resfident strategy fi fimfitates a mutant one j and 
T−(k) fis the probabfilfity that an findfivfidual off the mutant strategy fimfitates a resfident one fin a populatfion 
off k findfivfiduals playfing the resfident strategy. Tese probabfilfitfies are obtafined ffrom the fimfitatfion prob-
abfilfity deffned prevfiously:
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()= ( −)(+ ), ( )
β± Π()−Π()
−T k kN kN e1 33
k k
2
1
fi j
where Π fi(k) and Π j(k) denote the average payoffs off the ffocal player and her opponent:
Π()=( −) +( −)− , ( )k
k W N kW
N
1
1 34fi
fifi fij
Π()= +( − − )− . ( )k
kW N k W
N
1
1 35j
jfi j
Te probabfilfitfies deffned by equatfion (32) determfine a transfitfion matrfix off a Markov chafin among 
strategfies, assumfing a suffcfiently low mutatfion rate49. Te normalfized efigenvector assocfiated wfith the 
efigenvalue 1 off that matrfix provfides the statfionary dfistrfibutfion off strategfies46,52, that represents the rela-
tfive tfime the populatfion spends adoptfing each off the strategfies.
Domfinant strategfies. One strategy A fis rfisk-domfinant agafinst another one B22,53,54 when 
πA,A + πA,B > πB,B + πB,A, where πfi,j fis the payoff that an findfivfidual playfing the fi-strategy obtafins when playfing agafinst another findfivfidual that plays the j-strategy. When the apology-fforgfiveness mechanfism 
fis fintroduced, these payoffs ffor the cooperatfing proposer (PC), deffectfing proposer (PD), and deffectfing 
acceptor (AD), fin the absence off nofise, are, respectfively: πPC,PC = − ε/2 + b − c, πPD,PD = − ε/2, πAD,AD = 0, πPC,PD = − ε/2 + γ − c, πPD,PC = − ε/2 + γ + b, πPC,AD = − ε + γ − c, and πAD,PC = − γ + b. Ten the coop-eratfive proposer fis rfisk-domfinant agafinst the deffectfive proposer when γ > c and agafinst the deffectfive 
acceptor when γ > c + 3ε/4 fin the absence off nofise and fiff al off them apologfise when makfing a mfistake.
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